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Missing the Fall
Maurizio Godorecci
------------------Review -essay of Donald P. Verene, The New Art of Autobiography:An
Essay on the "Life of GiambattistaVico Written by Himself " (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991)
The Autobiographyof Giambattista Vico has generally been regarded as
a complement to the New Sciencerather than a valuable work in itself.
The destiny of this work was to be used, employed as an auxiliary text
by commentators of Vico's major philosophical writings, as D. P.
Verene states in The New Art of Autobiography:An Essay on the "Life of
Giambattista Vico Written by Himself" Coming from within this tradition, Verene essays instead to write a book which would do justice to
Vico's "most undervalued work." (vii) Taking the lead from Croce's
assertion that the Autobiography is the New Science in action, Verene
pledges to fill in the space opened by Croce who did not pursue his
very own instigation. In this pursuit of "justice," the Autobiographywill
stand in its own right as the first of its kind. It will have achieved the
exemplary status that the Venetian sponsors wished for it and the
whole genre will be forced to redress its modern foundations. The
originality of the Autobiographyrests on what Max Harold Fisch called
the "genetic method." (The Autobiographyof GiambattistaVico, trans. by
M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1944). Preceding Fisch's translation (last printing 1990), the original
short preface states that "aside from the light it sheds on his other
works, and the interest it has in common with every other intellectual
autobiography,Vico' s has the unique interest of being the first application of the genetic method by an original thinker to his own writings."
(v) Verene is thus going to add a new chapter to Vico's work by
extending himself beyond Croce while leaning on Fisch's insight.
Indeed, Fisch does not lend any definition for "genetic method,"
forcing Verene to secure one first in a note and then repeatedly in the
text. The definition in the note defying its marginality will overshadow all the others that will follow. It reads:
Fisch does not define "genetic method." I take the term in its broad
sense to refer to the fact that Vico' s purpose is to understand his life as
an intellectual development that moves from step to step and which has
an overall coherence . As will be shown, in Vico' s case this coherent pattern of development is tied to his conception of "ideal eternal history"
and "providence." (note 4, p . 2)
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When compared with Rousseau's Confessions,the originality of
Vico' s Autobiographyrests on an additional expansion of this definition
which in Verene's words is now "a systematic narrative applying the
genetic method to the causes of his own writings." (60) The quotation
marks have disappeared, the writer having made what was Fisch' s
instigation his own by turning it into a definition. Following this
appropriation by an act of inference, "Vico's purpose" is to find a
"coherent pattern" linked to his philosophy. And by proceeding "from
step to step," Vico will understand the "overall coherence" of his life.
A few pages ahead, juxtaposed with Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576)
who wrote De vita proprialiber, Vico is the one who "as the discoverer
of the philosophical order of history, applies this historical manner of
thought to himself." (70) By now the "genetic method" has turned into
an application of the workings ("generative") of history operated by
an outsider who, like an archaeologist, brings forth the causes of
things step by step, that is, causes that "are internal to their natures"
and that "emerge in the development of their natures." (71) Thus
"nature" is not strictly "nascimento" -something
that happens-but
something that "develops" too. And the reason of the analysis weighs
more on the causality principle than on divination of the event.
Therefore the rhetoric of narration is focused on persuasion rather
than on performance.
Verene sets three aims for his procedure: to look for the principles of the New Science in the structure of Vico's Autobiography; then,
following their identification, such principles must be verified; and
lastly, one must enter the "theatre of memory" (46-47) that links the
inner to the outer world with particular consideration towards the
"order" of the unfolding of events. The identification and the verification of principles are here a scientific procedure that implies appropriation and reproduction of a transferable entity. According to this, Vico
is the "possessor of an original philosophical understanding of the origin of narrative itself." (47) Thus Vico is the "discoverer" of a new literary art, as new as his "science," since his autobiographyis the first not
only "to apply a genetic method" but the first to link its narrative to a
philosophy "based on a new scienceof narration." (47)
The Autobiographyand the New Scienceare strictly interconnected
regarding the first two points. After the application and the verification of the New Science,what is left are the implications, Verene says.
But these implications are still linked to the translation of the concept
"new." The "new" of the New Science is translated into the unspoken
yet powerful "new" of the (New) Autobiography. This operation is in
want of identifying and possibly defining a new genre. A genre which
as any genre is still evolutionistic at its heart-as here the terms "generative" and "method" both imply. Furthermore, such a distinction
underlies, or better, restates an older one, namely that of separating
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the sphere of philosophical writing from that of literary writing. How
can one separate this "new science of narration" from the "nuova arte
critica" of the new science?As the "nuova arte critica" invents the New
Science, the new "new science of narration" is already at work. There
can be no "New Science"outside narration. And indeed for Vico the relevance of myth only testifies to this. Narration is at work from the
beginning as a new "ars critica." The novelty of the science is strictly
linked to that "ars." In fact, "new science" is already "new ars critica."
The two cannot be thought of as a couple. On the contrary, the novelty
of the new sciencerests upon praxis; the attention is shifted completely
towards the performative whereas it used to lie on metaphysical
premises.
It is seductive to think of the New Scienceas of a new autobiography of humanity (71) but the operation must carry a judgement and it
must be reflexive in structure and ironic in narration, that is, self-narrating. In this we recognize the character of "legere" -the jurisprudence which is at the core of the New Science.And law is actually three
movements in one: lex as legere(to link), se ligandoas reflexive link, and
legenda as the recounting of the link, i.e., the linking. (Cf. E. Grassi,
"L' origine des sciences de l' esprit dans l'Humanisme,
Pensee
Humaniste et tradition Chretienne aux XV et XVI siecles [Paris:
Publication de la Societe d'Etudes ltaliennes, 1950]) Such an operation
cannot take place without the unmasking of the "conceits" ("borie").
The destruction of the "borie" is the constant task of the New Science.
(NS,# 1111) The autobiographyof the human race can, as a myth (vera
narratio), be narrated again truthfully only once its translation is
accounted for. Therefore the allegorical dimension is reinstated to testify to the diversity of the voices (diversiloquium)that are true, that are
etymological to language.
The implications of which Verene speaks open the discussion
towards a hermeneutic which does not challenge the architecture of
the whole. On the contrary, he speaks of overall coherence, of discovery of the origins of things upon which to recreate the whole. In this
sense there can be knowledge. The "theatrical" is relevant only as a
useful means toward awareness; it is not recognized to be the only
aspect of human understanding. The "intention" of the author is fundamental to the definition of the felicitous or infelicitous outcome of
any interaction-in
this case a linguistic interaction. And the space is
left open for the intention of the text which is expressed in the possible
permutation of its "parts." Of course the role of the reader is rationalized as well in his intention to let the text speak the language of the
author.
Representation is at work in every human endeavor from the
beginning. In this sense one cannot speak of a reality underlying the
representation as a given. Representation is already reality-reality as
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translation. The fable is at the heart of humanity. The tropes of the
destruction of the "borie" are in themselves metaphors, to which the
three basic institutions of God, marriage and burial testify. The geometry of mankind rests upon these three figures which are the "principi,"
origins and principles, of the metaphorical construction which begins
with themselves being metaphors. They represent the poetic or credible impossibility of the "link." A link which is at work first of all within each of them in their singularity. A link that stresses the reflexive
while narrating itself. The "generative" aspect of Vico's method
should take these workings into consideration.
The question of the method still remains. Verene's statement
does not differentiate the method he speaks of from the common
understanding of the term, at least since the seventeenth century. With
Descartes, and probably due to the elaboration of his followers,
method becomes synonym for linearity and its virtue lies in its applications. On the other hand, metahodos ("after the way") not only suggests the idea of "following" but also that of "beyond." It is possible to
go after the way only if one goes beyond the way. In this sense what is
being stressed is not so much the correctness but the seduction of the
way which rather than compelling us to stay on it, seduces us to "pursue" it, not to trust it but to take possession of it. Such a "way" wants
to be "courted" and not obeyed.
So we cannot go astray from what seduces us-from our illusions. We are not look ing any longer for "persuasion," only for action .
We want to be there when it happens. The "ratio" is now definitely
lost and the "way" leads.
The above aspect of method together with what we have said
about "generative" lead to what is "critica." "Critique" and "soothsaying" parallel "critica" and "divination" in Vico. At the end of "Part
B," in the Autobiography the concept of "nuova arte critica" is introduced as a powerful force to judge the writers whose conceits must be
destroyed. To "judge" is first of all to be understood in its juridical
sense and then as "sifting" the true, as divination. Such discretion in
reading escapes the English translation (cf. 167) as even the word
"arte" is reduced to "method." But there is more . This new critical art
"scuopre," unmasks, the way in which men first feigned themselves
by feigning their own gods and the whole world . This novelty is tied
to the narration seen as performative. The Autobiography performs
according to such critique.
"Divinare" (cf. NS, # 342) is "indovinare," what is hidden from
men ("agli uomini") and what is hidden in men ("degli uomini"). The
first reference is to the future, yet Vico uses the word "avvenire."
"L' avvenire" is not simply the future, it is also what is going to come .
"Avvenire" here is "inventio." It implies that invention is divine and is
therefore "sacer ." The second hidden thing is "consciousness." This is
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not simply what is hidden in men but what is hidden "of" men. What
is hidden of men is knowledge (con-scire). With a double movement,
the "of" in "degli" implies belonging as detachment. Thus "coscienza"
is what exceeds men. What is different "of" men and "avvenire" is
what is precluded to men. Yet men's exceeding will fill the remainder
of invention as ad-venire turns into in-venire. To see the "link" (legere)
that exceeds the event is to proleptically live it; i. e., divine what is hidden. So Vico, in divining his own "falls," gives us an account of his
life. In order to do so he has to go beyond his very life. Thus Vico's use
of the third person which contextually works in this direction, rather
than serving as a simple historical continuation of some incipit of
other autobiographies, such as Chiabrera' s (cf. 66-67), or as oppositional to the Cartesian "I," as Fisch remarks. Vico's critique to his own
life is a "link." Vico is beyond his tomb, beyond his "written" life and
speaks from there as if he were already dead. His Vita is a tomb, an
open tomb and an open womb which generates itself. It is a reflexive
operation for which the beginning is already a repetition. The "I" is
already "he," the Life of G. B. Vico already the credible impossible life
of the other: the other that is in ourselves and whose friendship we
cherish beyond "dust." And with such friendship, thinking of
Socrates, Vico goes beyond his Vita. The inequity of the sentence as
expressed by Phaedrus includes the "fall" in the "judgement." Only
after death is there hope. The Life of Vico is always being judged, and
as any "lives," never equitably. Justice is a matter of the beyond.
The autobiography, or self-biography, or periautography as Carlo
Lodoli preferred to call it, does not necessarily stress the subject, as
Verene clearly points out. They only stress the surroundings, the place,
the topos, since such writing's only concern is reflexive. It is the concern with itself lived as other. It stresses the irony of narration, its own
irony.
We are reminded that since the nineteenth century it is a commonplace to regard every philosophy as autobiographical. (ix-x) This
is an idea taken up again in the discussion of Dilthey's perspective.
(48-51) Nevertheless "idiomatic" should be preferred since the reflexive aspect of the narration is part of any philosophy. And the idiomatic
is linked to invention which, as for the law, is common but not communicable. Indeed one might say that the first autobiography was a
hieroglyph-a
first signature. Yet that signature had less to do with
"being" than with "law." The autobiography is concerned with law
because it is concerned with the "mark," with "character," with writing. The first concern of such writing is writing itself. Furthermore, it
wouldn't be redundant to mention that the word autobiography is relatively new. It apparently first appeared in English, and not much earlier than the nineteenth century (cf. 53-54). Vico, as others before him,
used the title stressing the word "life" and "writing" -Vita di
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GiambattistaVicoscritta da se medesimo.
One's autobiography as well as the autobiography of humanity
is concerned with the forces that allow for their structure. At the same
time these forces can only be known proleptically, which is tantamount to recognizing the underlying nihilistic aspect of life in general.
Where life goes, its place can only be accounted for after, though it
must be pre-given. In this sense, Vico' s new critical art deals with our
belatedness. It is like reading backwards what goes forwards. And in
all autobiographythe singular events of life are turned into the general
law of that same life. The way in which Vico deals with this is represented in the "fall." The result of each fall is singular and yet it is elevated to a universal status-to be exemplary, to be law. The singularity
is reinforced by connecting the fall with a particular malady. The fall
and the sick body go hand in hand. What follows is a period of remission in which the sickness is the only concern for the healing person.
These "falls" are signs. They represent the indelible marks of one's life.
They are writing. A writing that can only be divined. And as pointed
out, divination is the unmasking of what needs to be unmasked-the
future as invention. Thus a rhetorical art is needed to perform the
"credible impossibility" of the poetic world, that is, of the human
world. And such a "making" is actually one with destruction. First of
all it is the revelation of the singular as a general-a true unmasking
which is equated to the destruction of the conceits, what we might call
special interests. And at the same time, by such a reversal, what passes
for general, universal, is actually bared to its singularity. The outcome
of the operation is a "restoration" of the particular. The certain is
restored as a wayfarer is restored-he is fed, he is taken care of. In this
sense, Vico takes care of his falls.
Falls and sickness are interlocked in what is a critical moment.
The crisis must be dealt with. And the questioning of the mark has to
deal with writing. The judgment must be passed on written texts. And
indeed Vico's new critical art is defined as such. The events in life, customs, etc., can be the subject of the "new science" as well as of one's
autobiography, but first and foremost they must be writing. Vico's
unmasking is based on books because books represent the fall, the
conceits of humanity as such. Humanity's shortcomings are in "writing." Writing is restored its unfulfilled character. Writing which wants
to be the same once and forever does not exist. Its signature is denied
by its very be-coming something else each time that it tries to be itself.
Writing's only concern is with its own 'falls'. Such is Vico's account for
the two autobiographies written by himself and written by humanity.
Both narrations are allegorical ironies of the credible impossibility of
being in the world.
The Life of GiambattistaVico Written by Himself might be a "new science of narration" but only if the novelty reflects a new attitude toward
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writing. Narration as writing is a reflexive act and as such it is concerned with law. Law is not "being." Jove's providence is Jove's prudence-already
a juris-prudence . Jurisprudence is the product of the
human mind, it is its own providence. It is writing as forces without a
field to determine their influence. These forces make and dissolve the
field (context) of their own determination. This is the universal language Vico speaks of-a mental language that partakes of both living
and dead (languages). A language which cannot be reduced to the
binary division between "langue" and "parole." There is no selfawareness on the part of the subject; indeed there is no pregiven subject in such language. This language is the topos to allow everything
else (institutions) to be; yet it is none of them since it is not the pregiven place of being (or not being). It is different from any rhetorical argument or given topics such as God, marriage, and burial. In fact, such
mental language is the language of "mind." It is a language and a
mind that cannot be identified with the specific languages of men and
it cannot be identified with the expression of any conceit. At the same
time it is not a language that transcends all the other languages of the
conceits. It is not a language according to our understanding of the
word. In Vico's words, it is jurisprudence as one with mind. It is mind
that allows for choice, Vico says. It is human choice at work. Yet it cannot be assimilated to any such choices. It allows for judgement. But it
is not judgement. This mind (language) of jurisprudence
is "nowhere." It works as difference in what is and in what is not-it allows
for choices to happen . All we have is "choice" ("fall"), that is, the singular, the idiomatic; indeed as do Vico' s life and philosophy begin
with a fall and not simply with birth. Life begins with choices be it the
fall from the ladder, in Vico' s case, or the thunder, in the history of
mankind. And in this process of choosing, mind is at work. The mental
language is at work first of all as a sign (hieroglyph, etc), as writing
and choices (falls, errors) are made in response to the reading of such
signs which, like forces, push us about. Only those who do not give up
and rather put up a fight will succeed in "being" as a product of themselves. This is the case for the "giants" who are authors and owners of
their own "eye" ("I")-i. e., customs, altars, fields, etc.
Such mental language does not exist, since it has no place to be;
and it is not Being since it precedes being-it must be before anything
can be in it or not be in it. In this manner such a place is beyond the
places of being(s).
The fall as a choice is an im-position just as a "character" is for
Vico. Character and name are the same. They are written and they are
writing. Theim-position is over-, trans-, being as the "excess" of being;
as what "remains" (unspoken). A character, a signature is over its own
name, its own determination, imposition, framing, and is already
other. This is the generative aspect of Vico's Life: a life which we are
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still writing and which exceeds all that has been named already. Thus
it is a life not yet written about a character not yet framed-a life of a
name, Vico, who like Homer, though very relevant, never took place in
the world.
These are the workings of providence. Phronesisis "the faculty of
the individual to assess where he stands in a particular situation" (13334). Phronesis, prudence for the ancients, is turned into sapientia by
Vico (148). But it is a knowledge that started by dealing with what
happened as if it never happened and with what had not happened as
if it had already happened. This is basically Vico's definition of
primeval jurisprudence. Indeed once we get well from a fall, all we are
concerned with is that fall. In its extreme consequences, when we are
faced with someone's death, with the death of a friend, all we can do
is to mourn over it. Yet when the mourning is over all we are concerned with can only be death. This is the passage from memory to
memorialization
(cf . Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other"
[Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1989]). Our concern with
the "fall" as "death," as memorialization is the work of providenceof mind, Vico says, for which and by which everything is made. And
the made is the true ; the true is made (by our concern with the
unavoidable). Thus the unavoidability of what might always already
have happened (as "fall," "death," etc.) but never took place in the
world. The New Science as providence at work and as the result of
providential intervention is "no-place" because it might always
already have been (ignota latebat).But the point is not to uncover it, it
is to invent it-to divine it from the marks with which we are left; to
invent the credible impossibility of the works of human mind whose
only concern is with the "fall."
Our fall, the fall that hasn't taken place yet is all we are concerned with. Our own demise has been announced in the death of the
other which now is memorialized in ourselves. Such death is the only
one we have ever experienced and whose recurrence is announced by
our concern. In our avoiding that death we delay our own death . Yet
there is a debt we must render, for which we must give reason. And
that debt concerns our own death of which the memorialization of the
other's death in ourselves is the place that nurtures it by delaying it. It
is our protection, our self-preservation from our only fall. By memorializing the death of the other in ourselves, we prepare for our own. In
such a way our own death is already recurring before it ever took
place. It cannot be avoided since we never experienced it; yet it is
already taking place. And in our lives we live awaiting the moment in
which it will occur, that moment in which it will return. That moment
will mark our life by decreeing our death as the eternal return of the
same. Meanwhile in reliving our death infinite times we relive our
lives infinite times. Our lives, our names, are like each word, already
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said yet spoken for the first time. We can try to avoid the falls that
have already happened, but this won't protect us from those falls
which have never taken place. In this sense our lives cannot have a
"signature" since our lives cannot be comprehended even in the cycles
of our lives. Indeed the cycle of each man's life is an infinite recurrence
of itself in difference. In our expectation of the end(s) of life, we live
through the end of life.
The New Art of Autobiography touches upon many of these issues
which Verene chooses to present within an historical (and at times,
structural) frame of reference. The New Science and the Autobiography
are no exception to the rule. The binary analysis finds its way to a diagrammatic representation of the fall (174); and this movement from
birth to rebirth exemplifies the tendency of the whole book towards an
open-ended conclusion.
In Vico the narrative of history rather than the narrative of myth
(83-84) recuperates the critical aspect of narration. However Vico must
"invent himself as an historical being" (84) thus reaching a meeting
ground between the two apparently opposed aspects of narration.
Consequently, Vico's "life" shall become a fable.
In order to pursue the instigation, Verene juxtaposes Vico with
Descartes and with Augustine-less
so with Rousseau and not at all
with Nietzsche. These contrasting figures either by their presence or
absence delimit the field of action of the present study which rests on
the "Vichean perspective." (114). The author is well aware of the danger inherent in interpretation (126). In fact, by judging what is unfamiliar by what is familiar (NS, #122), one can turn interpretation into
those same conceits that Vico intends to destroy. The way Verene
chooses is a third one, namely "to enter into Vico's thought to discover
the lever and fulcrum Vico uses to lift the world." (126). The legitimacy of this third way lies in Vico's invitation to the reader to meditate
his own New Science. What is not stated by the justification is that Vico
tells the reader that because of this, he will feel God-like and will experience a divine pleasure. Nothing is said about translating such meditations into applications. This is so because any application is an act of
translation which presupposes communication, homogeneity and continuity with regard to both the fields of analysis and the method. In
this dimension, understanding is actually the only reason for all interpretations. The attention of the reader is so focused on his goal that he
will tend to overlook the singular movements operated in the text at
hand. To enter into Vico's thought is tantamount to putting oneself in
Vico's place, playing Vico's part and corning out with the correct reading of the part according to the author's mind who preserved his
intention in his works. This is not simple common sense. It is the
adherence to a conceit that resists to be seen as such. And the most
authoritative formulation is in Leibniz's assertion that nihil est sine
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nihil, of course. This implies that a new art of criticism
which identifies the crises of human history must be a radical criticism
of the foundation of this same history. And indeed Vico' s criticism
starts with the power of the nihil: the "thunder" and the "fall." To
enter Vico's thought is first of all to think again this very thought-the
only one indeed since jovis omnia plena. The conceits arose as soon as
men forgot this.
The connection between fabula and historiaseems to be using narrative rather than being narrative. For Verene the new critical art is
"meditation that brings the philological certains of history together
with the philosophical history of ideas" (157). This allows for the reading of Vico's Life as a fable in as much as it recognizes the relevance of
the myth. And the proof for this is to be found in Vico' s willing mistakes throughout his narration. Verene recuperates these "mis-" by
reading in them a perfectly hidden architecture made up of all the possible permutations of a given data (cf., Ch. 5), and so follows the
lengthy explanation of the hidden meanings of the number 70 and its
readings starting from the speculation on Vico' s misgiven birthdate
(177-85). To enter into Vico's thought has turned into finding Vico's
recondite wisdom whose power, once released, leaves us with a cabbalistic universe.
The radical question about the relevance of the fable at the beginning of it all is not posed; it is simply traced back to other ideas of
fables. In this sense the Autobiography of Vico, at best, turns into an
exercise of a method avoiding the major issues of authority, text and
history as part of fable. Vico says that there is no book before his New
Science(NS, # 330) and Verene suggests that as odd as this may seem it
is linked to a reference to Descartes (211) and it is justified by the fact
that no book is endowed with such an original method of narrative.
The attention still falls on the arrangement of the book, on the texture
as a structural entity rather than on its grammatological implications.
Vico's repetitions are not all part of an infinitely limited universe. They
are the impossible reiteration of the "fall" in ever-differing contexts.
Metaphysics is concerned with its own modifications and Vico's New
Science is concerned with its own language. The Autobiography is no
exception. And the writing of the Autobiographyis our writing's concern. Verene misses the opportunity to complete his otherwise keen
reading by purposely avoiding such a path. Indeed Verene asserts that
to focus on writing as the only subject of an autobiography is equivalent to not having a "life" at all (cf. reference to Augustine, 99). By concluding with Joyce, Verene, who strikes out in the right direction, still
avoids bringing his insights to their extreme consequences. His thematic concern identifies the direct presence of Vico in Finnegans Wake
(227-31) and leads to the statement that "No more complicated a commentary is likely to be written on Vico, who in Joyce's hands becomes
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himself the symbol for the complete speech of the human world."
(228) This comment is very close to asserting that Vico's presence in
Joyce's work is only in language. Vico's immortality is not at stake;
there is only writing. No comparison is possible: only the singularity
of writing faces those must write about it.
In preparing for a death that never took place, we live a life we
have never lived, and we speak in a language we have never spoken
as we read in a language we have forgotten.

